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emerge from the analysis:  corruption.
* An increase in government revenue (from windfalls,  He finds no evidence that donors systematically
for example, or from increased foreign aid) does not  allocate aid to countries with less corruption.
necessarily lead to the provision of more public goods  The results accord with recent empirical findings that
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rent-dissipation and reduce productive public spending.  aid policy that in the short run  provides more assistance
But if the donor  community can enter into a binding  to countries in less need and less aid to those in most
policy commitment, this result may be reversed.  need. Enforcing such a regime shift might be difficult.
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1.  Introduction
Empirical evidence indicates that rent-seeking is a serious problem in the third world.
This type of discretionary redistribution also tend to be particularly severe in "good"
times. For instance, Ahmad Khan (1994) emphasizes  the pervasiveness  of corruption
and other side-interests as a result of the oil boom in Nigeria and Gelb (1988) and
Little et al.  (1994) attributed  low post-boom growth rates following  positive terms
of trade  shocks to the fact that  windfalls were either consumed or invested in (low
return) projects benefiting  special interests. A country-specific  example illustrates the
point.  "Public spending in Nigeria during the oil boom in the early 1990s  increased
by more than 50 percent. yet over the same period school enrollment shrunk due to
tight education funding. The Nigerian Nobel Prize winner and dissident writer Wole
Soyinka (1996)  notes that  a government-appointed  commission  of inquiry was unable
to account for what happened to much of the 1990s  government  oil windfall" [Easterly
& Levine (1996)].
Causal empiricism suggest that the dramatic increase in foreign aid over the past
three decades has had a similar effect in many countries.  For instance, the  World
Bank reports that the rapid increase in foreign  exchange  resources, mainly due to large
concessional  flows,  has greatly expanded the opportunities of malfeasance [World  Bank
(1989)  p.27,61],  and Klitgaard (1990)  gives  a vivid description  of aid-related corruption
in Africa. In many developing countries foreign assistance is an important source of
revenue, constituting more than 50 percent of total government revenues (exduding
grants) for the 30 most aid-dependent countries in 1970-90.  Despite this vast resource
transfer, a number of empirical studies, dating back at least to the study by Griffin
(1970),  have shown that the macroeconomic  effects  of aid are, at best, ambiguous. This
holds true not only for traditional macroeconomic  variables such as investment and
growth, but also with respect to measures of social and human development [Boone
(1996)].
To explain this puzzle we develop a game-theoretic rent-seeking model in which
(social) groups compete over common-pool resources.  The common resources can
either be invested in public goods, or be appropriated for private consumption. The
latter either by means of direct appropriation (seizure of power) or manipulations of
bureaucrats and politicians to implement favorable transfers, regulations and other
redistributive policies. In a static setting it is not hard to see how this setup can lead
to a Pareto-inefficient  Nash equilibrium: each group will be strictly  better off if all
reduced their costly appropriation efforts, but an unilateral decrease is not rational for
the individual social group. However,  since the social groups interact repeatedly, this
1may provide a mechanism which can reduce the conflict of interest.'  At the same time,
these  forces  may not  suffice to  deliver  the  first-best  outcome  since full cooperation
among  the  groups  maximizes  the  reward  for  behaving  opportunistically.  Hence,  it
is possible  to  envision  an  economy  where  the  degree  of  cooperation  among  social
groups is, at the margin,  balancing the benefit of cooperative  behavior with the cost of
sustaining  the  equilibrium.  This  idea has been applied  in the industrial  organization
context  by  Rotemberg  & Saloner  (1986), who analyzed  the  way tacit  coordination
among producers  with  market  power varies throughout  the business cycle.
This paper  employs a similar mechanism in a political  economy context.  We show
that  an  increase  in  government  revenues,  under  certain  circumstances,  lowers the
provision of public  goods.  This  provides  an explanation  for why large disbursements
of aid, or windfalls, do not necessarily lead to increased welfare. Second, we show that
the mere expectation  of aid according to the recipients'  future needs may increase rent
dissipation  and  reduce the  expected number  of periods  in which efficient policies can
be  sustained.  This  may  be an  important  observation  because  a  positive  correlation
between recipient's  needs and  aid flows has been noted in the literature.
These results  have three  novel implications.  First,  since concessional  assistance
may  influence policy  in  the  recipient  country  even  without  any  resources  actually
being  disbursed,  evaluations  of project  and  sector  assistance  may  overestimate  the
total  impact  of foreign aid.  Second,  the effects of development  aid critically  depend
on the political  equilibrium  in the recipient  country.  An empirical  investigation  of the
rnacroeconomic impact  of aid that  does not  take  this  into  account  may  yield biased
results.  Finally, if the donor community  can enter  into a binding policy commitment,
aid may mitigate  the incentives for social groups to engage in rent-seeking  activities.
The  empirical  prediction  of  the  model  is that  discretionary  aid,  and  windfalls,
in  countries  with  divided  policy  control,  will on  average  be  associated  with  higher
rent-seeking  activities.  Motivated  by the theory,  we specify a simultaneous  equation
system  to  test  this  implication.  To this  end, we try  to identify  characteristics  of the
political  and  socio-political structure  of a country which are plausibly  correlated  with
the  existence of influential  social groups and,  consequently,  a divided policy process.
As the dependent  variable we employ an index of corruption.  Although  the results  are
only preliminary,  we are encouraged  by the fact that  we cannot  reject that  the model's
prediction  is consistent  with  the  data.  In particularly,  we find  that  foreign  aid and
windfalls, in countries suffering from a divided policy process, are on average associated
with  higher  corruption.  We find no evidence that  the  donors systematically  allocate
aid  to  countries  with  less corruption,  which is  what  the  model  of donor  assistance
under  discretion  predicts.
There  is only limited  work on foreign aid and endogenous  macroeconomic  policy.
Casella  &  Eichengreen  (1994)  show,  in  line  with  our  results,  using  the  Alesina  &
Drazen  (1991) model,  that  the  prospect  of aid can actually  exacerbate  the  delay in
stabilization,  by inducing  the  social groups  to  postpone  making  sacrifices  until  aid
'See Benhabib  & Rustichini  (1996)  for a dynamic  model  with this ingredient.
2actually  materializes.  In our  model, the  adverse impact  of aid may hold  irrespective
of specific timing  assumptions.  Further,  Ranis  & Mahmood  (1992) argue  that  the
availability  of external  resources  tends  to  promote  irresponsible  policies.  Boycko et
al.  (1996) discuss  the  impact  of foreign assistance  in  countries  characterized  by  a
divided government,  arguing that  aid may be counterproductive  if based on the wrong
premise  of government.  This  is an  argument  which  accords  well with  our  model's
prediction.  The  papers  closest  in  spirit  to  ours  are  Lane  &  Tornell  (1995,  1996).
They show that  in a growth  model with  several powerful interest  groups, a change in
productivity  (or terms of trade)  may lead to a reduction  in the growth rate.  They also
provide some empirical  evidence in support  of their  model.  Our analysis, by studying
a repeated  rather  than  a dynamic  game should be  regarded  as complementing  their
work.  However, our  model  differ from  that  of Lane & Tornell  in a number  of ways.
First,  the  chocks in  our  model  are  stochastic,  rather  than  a  one-time  change  in  a
perfect-foresight  model as in Lane & Tornell.  More important,  in Lane & Tornell, the
voracity  effect whereby  an increase  in the  raw return  to aggregate  capital  leads to  a
more than  proportional  increase  in redistributive  transfers,  is due to  a  coordination
failure  across  the  interest  groups.  Our  results,  on the  contrary,  arise  from  Pareto
constrained  responses by the social groups to changing incentives to deviate.  However,
the main  difference is that  we focus primarily  on foreign aid.  Foreign aid differs from
the  other  sources  of windfalls  in  that  the  outcome  depends  on  the  donors  actions.
Taking this explicitly  into account  we find that  foreign aid also affects the equilibrium
through  a less tangible  mechanism,  namely  the  mechanism that  enforces the  control
of rent dissipation  in the economy.
Recently  a  number  of studies  have empirically  investigated  the  macroeconomic
impact  of foreign aid. Boone  (1996) concludes that  aid primarily goes to consumption
and  that  there  is  no  relationship  between  aid  and  growth,  nor  does  it  benefit  the
poor  as measured  by improvements  in human development  indicators,  while Burnside
&  Dollar  (1997)  find  that  aid  has  a  positive  impact  on  growth  in  countries  with
"good" fiscal, monetary  and trade  policies.  The empirical section of the paper provides
additional  evidence on  the aggregate  impact  of foreign aid, but  rather  than  studying
the  relationship  between  aid and  growth, we study  the  relationship  between  aid and
corruption.  Contrary  to  existing  literature  on  foreign  aid,  we explicitly  take  into
account  that  the  impact  of aid is likely to depend  on the political  equilibrium  in the
recipient  country.
This paper  is organized  as follows. In section 2 the model is presented.  In section
3, the  noncooperative-  and  the  fully cooperative  equilibrium  in  the  stage  game are
derived.  The second best  equilibrium  is studied in section 4. In section 5 the model is
extended  by explicitly model the donor's  behavior.  Section 6 provides some empirical
results  and  section 7, finally, concludes.
32.  A  political  model  of public  spending  and  rent-dissipation
2.1.  The  model
Consider  an  economy  consisting  of n powerful  social  groups.  All groups  have  "common
access"  to the government's  budget  constraint.  More precisely,  at  the  beginning  of each
time  period  the  government  receives  income  (revenue)  Yt.  Income  can  be  used  either
on  local  public  goods,  or appropriated  by  each individual  social  group.  Appropriation
of  common  resources  is  costly.  Hence,  rent-seeking  outlays  by  group  i,  denoted  by
zi,  result  in  total  appropriation  equal  to  di  =  y  it  for  Zit >  0.  and  di  =  0 for
j=] -it
zit  =  O.2  Thus,  private  consumption  is
Yi  :or Zit =  °
Y(0t)  - zit + yi  :for zit >  0  (2.1)
where  y(Ot) is government  revenue,  cit  denotes  consumption  of the  ith  group,  and  Zit
denotes  rent-seeking  outlays  by  social  group  i,  all  expressed  in  time  period  t.  The
last  term  in  (2.1),  yi, denotes  the  exogenously  given  income  received  by  group  i at  the
beginning  of each  time  period.  We  think  of this  as  income  derived  from  the  informal
sector  or  from  capital  held  abroad.  It  is  assumed  that  yi  is  secure  from  appropri-
ation  from  others.  Equation  (2.1)  warrants  two  remarks.  First,  income  for  private
consumption  is  derived  from  two  sources:  appropriation  of government  revenue,  the
first  two  terms  in  (2.1),  and  from  the  secure  stock  of capital  (yi).  Second,  the  appro-
priation  technology  is exogenously  given.  It  can  be  irnterpreted  as  a  reduced  form  of
a  more  structural  model,  in  which  organized  social  groups  can  capture  a  large  share
of  government  income  either  by  means  of  direct  appropriation,  or  by  manipulating
the  political  system  to  implement  favorable  transfers,  regulations,  and  other  redistrib-
utive  policies. 3 This  implies  that  zit  is a  composite  variable  of both  direct  cost  for
redistribution;  such  as  bribes,  and  indirect  cost  of political  competition;  such  as pro-
tection  costs,  and  resources  employed  to  seize,  or attempt  to  seize,  power  and  restrict
opponents  political  activities.
We assume  that  y(Ot) is stochastic,  where  Ot is the  realization  at  t of the  observable
shock  to  revenues.  Income  is assumed  to  be  strictly  increasing  in  Ot and  we postulate
that  Ot  has  domain  [k,  0,  and  a  distribution  function  F(Ot).  Furthermore,  we assume
that  the  shocks  are  independently  and  identically  distributed  over  time.
2This setup builds on the seminal contribution by Tullock (1980). See Nitzan (1994) for a survey
on alternative ways of modelling rent-seeking contests.
3See e.g. Becker & Stigler (1974), Rose-Ackerman  (1975, 1978), Klitgaard (1988) and Acemoglu
& Verdier (1995) for principal-agent models of corruption and rent-seeking and Shleifer & Vishny
(1993) for an industrial organization perspective on corruption. References  to the earlier rent-seeking
literature includes, among others, Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974).
4Each  social group  has  a  population  of size 1.  There  is no  heterogeneity  within
groups.4 The  citizens  get  utility  from  consumption  and  public  projects.  The  per
period  utility  of the  ith  social group  (or individual)  is given by uit =  bit + Cit, where
bi =  pY(9t)  - E1  di  /n  is the amount  of local public goods benefiting group  i.
The social  groups  interact  strategically,  each maximizing  the  following expected
utility  function
E  E  EUit  (2.2)
t=O
subject  to the per  period  budget  constraint  Yc  <  Zit.
This model defines a repeated  game among the n social groups.  At the beginning of
each period,  Ot becomes  common knowledge.  The  social groups then  simultaneously
choose  rent  seeking  outlays  zi  E  [0,  Yc].  Resources  not  appropriated  by  the  social
groups  are thereafter  spent  on local public goods in a symmetric fashion.
A strategy  for the individual  social group is a policy function  zi(Ot) that  specifies
the amount  of rent-seeking  outlays  for each realization  of Ot.
3.  The  Stage  Game
To solve the  problem  we start  by calculating  the  symmetric  Nash-  and  cooperative
equilibrium  in the  stage game.
3.1.  Nash  equilibrium
Each social group  determines  the optimal  level of rent-seeking  outlays,  zit, taking  zjt
for j  =8  i as given. The first-order  condition  for this  problem  can be written  as
=IZt[  1-  z  1-1  =  0  (3.1)
Hence, in equilibrium  the marginal  gain of rent-seeking,  taking  the form of an higher
share  of total  net income, should  be equal to the marginal  cost, unity.  Solving for zit
and  summing over i gives us the aggregate  level of rent dissipation  in the economy
Zn(t)  = (n-  1) y(C)  (3.2)
where superscript  n denotes the symmetric Nash equilibrium.  Clearly, rent dissipation
is  an  increasing  function  of the  number  of social groups  and  the  aggregate  level of
income.
In the Nash equilibrium,  all common resources will be appropriated  from the bud-
get.  Hence, b'(0)  =  0 and En d!(0t)  = y(Ct). However, as appropriation  is costly, only
a fraction of the appropriated  resources will actually  benefit the social groups through
higher private  consumption.
4Hence, we abstract from collective choices  within the interest groups.
53.2.  Cooperation  among  the  social  groups
Now consider instead  the fully cooperative  equilibrium  in  which the  n social groups
cooperate  with  each  other.  The  symmetric  cooperative  equilibrium  is a  vector  of
feasible  policy  functions  [zi(0t), ..Zn(t)]  such that  all social  groups  exert  the  same
level of rent-seeking  activities  and zi(Ot) = argmax  F XE='  uit.
Clearly since rent-seeking is a zero-sum game in influence, but  a negative-sum game
in total  resources,  the  cooperative  equilibrium  has Z(Ot) =  0 V i.  Hence, in the  fully
cooperative  equilibrium  all resources will be spent on public projects,  V(0) =  y(Ot)/n.
Moreover, since rent-seeking  is costly, there  will be no rent-dissipation  in equilibrium.
Consequently,  utility  is strictly  higher than  in the Nash equilibrium.
4.  The  Repeated  Game
4.1.  Second  best  equilibrium  (SBE)
The  game described  in section  3 is a  repeated  game.. Hence, one equilibrium  is the
Nash  equilibrium  in  the  stage  game  repeated  infinitely.  However, infinitely  played
games of the  type  described  above are  usually  able  to  sustain  an  equilibrium  that
strictly  dominates  the  outcome  in the  corresponding  static  Nash equilibrium  played
repeatedly,  even if the groups cannot  sign binding contracts.  The extreme  case would
be if the  social groups  could sustain  the  fully cooperative  outcome  in  all states.  In
reality  the  actual  outcome  may lie between the  extreme  regimes of either  full coop-
eration  and  non-cooperative  behavior.  This is so because, on the one hand,  repeated
interaction  provides  a  mechanism  which  can sustain  a  subgame  perfect  equilibrium
(SPE)  with  higher payoffs for all groups with  trigger  strategies.  On the other  hand,
these forces may not  suffice to deliver the fully cooperative outcome in all states,  since
full cooperation  maximizes  the  reward  for  behaving  opportunistically.  Hence, it  is
possible  to  envision an  economy where  the  degree  of cooperation  among  the  social
groups  is, at the  margin,  balancing  the benefit  of cooperative  behavior  with  the cost
of sustaining  the  equilibrium.
To deter  groups  from  deviating,  the  equilibrium  rnust involve a mechanism  that
punishes  deviations.  One  such mechanism  would be  the  use of punishment  against
defecting  groups in periods  following the  defection  [see Friedman  (1971)].  A simple,
but  not  the only, way to ensure sequential rationality  is for the punishment  to involve
playing  of the  static  Nash-equilibrium  for  the  reminder  of the  game  after  the  first
defection is detected.  We restrict  attention  to these kind  of strategies.
One  important  observation  about  this  setup  is  in  order.  As  shown  by  Abreu
(1988),  the  highest  equilibrium  payoff is achieved  by  threatening  to  respond  to  a
deviation  by infinitely playing the  SPE which gives the player that  deviates  the lowest
possible SPE payoff. In general,  switching forever to the stage-game Nash equilibrium
is not  the  strongest  credible punishment.  Thus,  a  higher  expected  payoff could  be
6achieved by threatening  to  respond  with  a harsher  punishment.  However, provided
that  the  number  of social groups  are  sufficiently high,  it is obvious  from  equation
(3.2) that  the  stage-game  Nash  equilibrium  repeated  infinitely  approximately  yields
the lowest possible SPE payoff, since all common resources are dissipated.  In this case
the stage-game Nash equilibrium  is indeed the optimal punishment.  This implies that
we focus on the  equilibrium  that  lies on the constrained  Pareto  frontier  (second best
equilibrium,  i.e. the SPE which yields the highest expected  present  discounted  utility
of each  group  along the  equilibrium  path.  Due  to  institutional  arrangements,  social
norms  and  evolution  we believe it  is conceivable that  this  is the  "focal equilibrium"
the social groups will coordinate  on.
Definition  4.1.  The second best equilibrium (SBE)  is  a sequence of feasible policy
functions  [z2(Ot),  ..Zn(Ot)] such that:  (i)  all social groups exert the same  level of rent-
seeking activities;  (ii) the rent-seeking configuration is sustainable in equilibrium; (iii)
the  expected present  discounted utility  of  each group along the equilibrium path  is not
Pareto dominated  by other  equilibrium payoffs.
The equilibrium  is solved in two steps.  First, the highest sustainable  level of income
is determined  for a given punishment.  Second, the optimal  punishment  as a function
of the highest sustainable  level of income is derived.  This  defines a mapping  from the
set of possible punishments  into itself.  The fixed point  of this mapping,  then,  defines
a threshold value for at.
We start  by exploring  the options  of the pressure  groups for each value of Ot. Let
vC(Ot)  = y(Ot)/n  be the equilibrium level of "net"  utility  (i.e. net of own income yi) for
each social group  under  full cooperation.  Since Y(Ot)  is increasing  in Ot, "net-utility"
is increasing  in Ot.
Along the  cooperative  equilibrium  path,  an  increase  in  the  level of rent-seeking
with  an arbitrary  small amount  raises net-utility  for the group that  deviates to almost
y(Ot). Thus,  group  i would deviate from the joint  utility-maximizing  strategy  if
Y(0t) >  n  P  (4.1) n-1
where P  is the  punishment  inflicted on group  i in the future  if it deviates  at  time  t.
Note that  the higher Ot, the higher is y(Ot), and the greater are the incentives to deviate
for a given P.  Since y'(0t)  >  0, there  exist some Ot,  for which y(Ot) =  (n/(n  - 1)) P.
Thus,  if v(Ot) denotes  the  highest  level of net-utility  each  group  can sustain  in  the
SBE,
V(Ot)  v (Ot)  1  for St < Ot
(O()t) {  _ 1  forOt  > Ot
Clearly, the higher the  punishment,  P,  the higher the equilibrium  level of net-utility,
v(Ot). The future  loss from  deviation at some date,  discounted at  the same date,  can
7be stated as5
P(0)  =(1  _ 6)18  [v(6t,  Ot)  - v'(Ot)]  dF(Ot)  (4.3)
That  is, P is the difference  between the expected discounted value of utility from
time t+ 1 to oo, between the SBE, given in equation (4.2), and the repeated Nash equi-
librium. Clearly, P does not depend on the realization of Ot  at the time of deviation.
That is, total revenue at the time of deviation does not affect the punishment.
Equation (4.3) gives a mapping from the set of possible punishments into itself: a
given P implies a cutoff value Ot  from (4.2), which in turn defines a punishment level
from (4.3). The equilibrium of the model is the fixed point of this mapping with the
highest value of P, and hence, the highest level of utility for the social groups.
In appendix A.2.  we show that  sufficient conditions for the existence of a fixed
point are
(i)  (18)  >  n
(ii)  y(0)P  > (3/n2)E[y(0t)]
(iii)  YAS)ME[(St)]  >  (1-1(1)n
where  1  6/(1 - 6), F  (,B/(n  - 1) - 1) and E is the expectation operator.
Condition (i) and (ii) state that the discount factor must be sufficiently  high. Oth-
erwise  the social groups discount the future too much, implying that the punishment
become less  important and it will no longer be possible  to sustain the fully cooperative
equilibrium. Condition (iii) ensures that  full cooperation is not the only solution in
every state.  This condition is satisfied provided that  there is sufficient dispersion in
the distribution of revenues.
Lemma  4.2.  If  conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied, there exists a fixed point Ot such
that (4.2) holds with P  defined as in equation (4.3).
Proposition  4.3.  An increase in revenue above the threshold value, 6, lowers the
provision of public projects, leaving total utility unchanged. The equilibrium  configu-
ration for the endogenous  variables  are
bi(6t)  =  y(6t)/n,  ci(Ot) =  ye,  zi (0t)  = 0 for Ot < 6t
bi(0t) = 0,  ci(Ot)  = y(Ot)/n + yc,  zi(Ot)  = [y(Ot)  - Y(t)]  /n  for Ot  > °t
Proof.  Follows  from Lemma 4.2 and the first-order condition (3.1).  E
The higher the  income the higher the incentive to deviate from the  cooperative
conduct.  To counter-balance this,  the social groups must increase their  appropria-
tion rate so as to  reduce the aggregate net level of resources for redistribution.  In
equilibrium, all income gains above y(Ot) are dissipated, leaving welfare unchanged.
5Note  that  V'(0t)  - vn(Ot)  =  uc(ot)  - OA).
8Note that  in the SBE aggregate  appropriation  must  increase by more that  the rise in
income, implying  that  the  provision of public projects  actually  falls with  an  increase
in income above y(Ot).
This finding has one important  implication.  If the political  game described  in the
paper  is relevant,  and provided that  Ot  is near  °t,  we should observe surprisingly  small
or  in fact  even contractible  effects on welfare and  public  project  provision  following
increased  inflows of foreign aid, or windfall gains in revenue.  Hence, proposition  4.3
provides one explanation  for the poor macroeconomic impact of aid in many developing
countries,  as well as for the puzzling fact  that  windfalls may result  in reduced  public
investment  and  a disproportionate  increase in rent-seeking  activities.
Corollary  4.4.  An  increase in the number of social groups as an ambiguous effect
on Ot  starting from n = 1, but lowers the threshold value °t  starting from  a sufficiently
high n.
Proof.  See appendix  A.3.
The intuition  for this  result  is that  the  number  of social groups affects both  the
gain and the punishment  of a deviation.  The gain in private  consumption for the group
that  deviates  is ((n  - 1)/n))  y(Ot), which is clearly increasing  in  n.  However, at  the
same time a larger n implies that  the punishment  initially  becomes more severe, since
the difference in welfare between non-cooperative  and cooperative  behaviour  rises.
This  non-monotonic  response  stands  in  contrast  with  both  the  standard  result
from  the  common-pool  and  rent-seeking  literature,  as well as the  result  reported  in
Lane & Tornell  (1995).  They  show that  an  increase in  the number  of interest  groups
(starting  from n =  2) leads to a higher growth rate,  while the standard  finding is that
the free-rider  problem  is exacerbated  by an increase in n.
Corollary  4.5.  A  decrease in  the discount factor  lowers the threshold value Ot.
Proof.  E only affect Q2  through  the composite  parameter  3. As
dO > o  V 6 E (0, 1]
a fall in 6 raises P.  Again,  as Q is increasing  in Ot,  this must  be counter-balanced  by
a reduction  in 0 in order  to restore  the equilibrium.  U
The  intuition  for this  result  is straightforward.  The relative  gain  from deviating
rises  since the  punishment  is  discounted  more.  To  counter-balance  this  the  social
groups must  content  themselves  with  fewer states  in which the fully cooperative  out-
come is sustained.
5.  Aid  and  rent-dissipation:  the  indirect  linkage
The main point  highlighted  in this  section  is that  foreign aid may affect the equilib-
rium outcome not  only though  the direct  effect explored in previous  section, but  also
through  a  less tangible  mechanism,  namely  the  mechanism that  enforces the control
of rent dissipation  in the economy.
95.1.  A  modified  model
Consider  the  following extension  of the model  described  in section  2.  Besides  the  n
social groups there  is also now an external  actor, a donor.  We assume that  the donor's
preferences are partly  defined over total  welfare of the agents in the recipient  country.
Hence, the donor's  problem  is to maximize
E  6E t koft + W(St)A  (5.1)
t=1
subject  to the budget constraint  ft+at  < r.  In (5.1) ft  denotes the domestic activity  of
the donor at time t, st -E  uit, at is the level of aid disbursed at time t, r is the income
received  at  the  beginning  of each  period  and  w(.)  is a  concave,  increasing  function.
Alternatively,  ft  captures  the welfare of giving aid to  other  recipient  countries  or to
activities  not valued by the recipient.  Assuming that  the donor's utility  is linear in its
domestic  activity  simplifies the analysis.  However, the qualitative  results  do not hinge
on this  specification  [see appendix  A.5.]. The param(eter  o is the  constant  marginal
utility  of the  domestic  activity.
We believe that  (5.1) is a realistic and rather  general characterization  of the donor's
preferences.  The  empirical  literature  on the  determinants  of foreign aid  have found
that  aid is driven both  by the donor's  own interests  (captured  by f)  and by recipients'
needs  (captured  by s).6
We assume initially  that  aid is given in the form of public  project  provision.  As-
suming that  aid is disbursed  as untied  program support  does not  alter  the qualitative
result.  In fact  we consider the alternative  in section 5.1.2.
5.1.1.  Foreign  aid  with  discretion
Consider  first  a  discretionary  aid  regime  where  it  is impossible  to  commit  policy  in
advance.  Thus,  the  sequencing  of events  are  as  described  in  section  2.1  with  the
exception  that  the  donor now determines  the  level of aid  disbursed  simultaneously
with  the choices of the n social groups, taking  [zi(O),  . ..Zn(()]  as given.
The  equilibrium  in the  stage  game is characterized  by two conditions.  The  first
condition  defines the  amount  of rent-seeking  outlays  and  is described  in  section  3.
The  second concerns  the disbursement  of foreign aid,  and  is given by the  first-order
condition  of the donor's  maximization  program
wI  [ci(Ot  lat) + bi(Ot  lat)]|  =  (5.2)
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Figure  5.1:  Utility  in  the  cooperative-  & Nash  equilibrium  with  foreign  aid.
where  r  is  assumed  to  be  sufficiently  large  to  guarantee  an  interior  solution  and
ci(Qt  lat)  is defined in (2.1), and
bi(Otlat)=  [y(Ot)  +  at] - Pot)zi  (0t)]  (5.3)
when  the  social  groups  interact  non-cooperatively,  and  ci =  y, and  bi =  [y(Ot)  +  at]
when  they  act  cooperatively.  Thus,  aid  will  be  provided  to  the  point  where  the
marginal  utility  of  aid  is  equal  to  the  opportunity  cost  of foreign  assistance,  9p.  In
other  words,  the  inclusion  of a  donor  in  the  model  sets  a  lower  bound  on  the  welfare
of the  agents. 7
Figure  5.1  compares  utility  in  the  static  Nash-  and  cooperative  equilibrium  with
foreign  aid for different  values  of 0, where  u  =  w-)(p)/n  is the  lower  bound  on welfare.
Clearly,  since  the  payoff  in  the  Nash  equilibrium  is strictly  smaller  than  the  payoff  in
the  cooperative  equilibrium  for all 0, foreign  aid will affect  the  two scenarios  differently.
More  precisely,  more  aid  will  be  given  in  the  former  setting.  Thus,  the  presence  of a
donor  will increase  expected  welfare  in the  Nash-  relative  the  cooperative  equilibrium.
As the  punishment  is the  expected  discounted  difference  between  utility  in  the  second
best-  and  Nash  equilibrium,  foreign  aid  will  undermine  the  enforcement  mechanism
available  for  the  social  groups.
Proposition  5.1.  A  discretionary  aid policy will make  cooperative behaviour more
difficult  to sustain  thereby lowering the threshold value Ot.
Proof.  See appendix  A.4. 0
A  discretionary  aid  policy  of  higher  aid  disbursements  when  income  is  low  will
undermine  the  enforcement  mechanism  available  for  the  social  groups.  Since  harsh
7We  assume  that  w-'($s  <  n  u'(O)  so that  consumption  is not  constant  in the  fully  coopera-
tive  equilibrium.
11punishment  facilitates  cooperation,  foreign aid  makes  cooperation  more  difficult  to
sustain.  As  a  result,  the  social  groups must  content  themselves  with  fewer periods
in which the fully cooperative  outcome  can be sustained.  Consequently,  the expected
level of rent  dissipation  will increase.
This  result  warrants  four remarks.  First,  it is not  the  actual  increased  disburse-
ment  of aid  in  bad  states  that  drives  the  result,  but  the  expectation  that  this  will
happen.  Hence, the fact that  the donor acts  according to  recipient's  needs may by it-
self increase rent dissipation  in the recipient country, arLd  reduce the number of periods
in which efficient policies can be sustained.  Note that  this result  differs from the time-
consistency  and  Samaritan's  dilemma  problem  explored in the literature  on altruism
and transfers  [see e.g.  Lindbeck & Weibull (1988), Coate  (1995) and Svensson (1997)].
In these papers,  the recipient  strategically  try  to free-ride on the donor's  concern; the
recipient  knows that  the  donor  will bail  him out  in  the  future  and  therefore  exerts
lower effort today.  Here, on  the contrary,  the  linkage is more subtle:  expectation  of
aid undermines  the  mechanism that  enforces the control of rent dissipation.
Second, in this setup,  aid is effective at the micro-level while having adverse macro-
economic consequences.  Since all  aid disbursed  is used for project  implementation,
evaluation  of  the  impact  of aid  from  a  micro-perspective  would not  pick up  these
potentially  adverse effects.  Hence, the model provides  a possible explanation  for the
so called macro-micro  paradox  that  has  been discussed in the  aid-literature  [see e.g.
Mosley (1987) and  White  (1992)].8
Third,  even though  the  aid  relationship  causes  corruption,  the  social groups  are
better  of (in expected  terms)  with aid than  without.
Finally, taking  the model literally, rent-seeking  and aid cannot  coexist in the SBE.
The reason for this is that  for all y(O) < y(01), welfare is constant  along the equilibrium
path.  Thus,  if it is profitable  to  deviate  at  some y(O) < y(Gi), i.e.  if y(O) <  y(01),
it  must  be profitable  to  deviate  for all y(O).  In this  case, of course,  there  exist  no
equilibrium.  Hence,  0  >  01.  It  is straightforward  to  generalize  the  model  so that
rent-seeking  and  aid can co-exist in the  SBE. As shown in appendix  A.5., a sufficient
condition  for this  is that  the  donor's  utility-function  over  the  domestic  activity  is
concave rather  than  linear.
5.1.2.  Foreign  aid  with  commitments
Now consider instead  an  environment  in  which  the  donor  can  enter  into  a  binding
policy  commitment  before  the  social groups  choose rent-seeking  outlays.  That  is,
suppose  the  timing  is  such  that  the  donor  first  chooses aid  as  a  function  of Oand
zi...zn-  Then,  observing  a (0t, z(Ot)),  the  social  groups  choose  zi(O) ...z,(0).  We assume
now instead  that  aid  is given as untied  program  support.  Consequently,  aggregate
8The paradox is that  whilst micro-level  evaluations have been, by and large, positive, those of the
macro evidence have, at  best, been ambiguous.
12government  income in each period  is y(Ot) + a (0t, z(Ot)), where z(Ot)  is the  vector of
rent-seeking  outlays.
The equilibrium  can be computed  by backward induction.  From the discussion at
the end of previous  section it follows that  we only need to consider aid disbursement
under  two different  institutional  settings,  namely  when  the  social groups  cooperate
and  when they  interact  non-cooperatively.  In both  cases, the  last  stage of the  game
is identical  to  that  described  in section  3, with  y(Ot) replaced  by y(Ot) + a (0t, z(Qt)).
These conditions will act as incentive constraints  on the donor's maximization  program
in the first stage of the  game.  The first-order  conditions for the  donor are
w' (a(0t,z(Ot))  ±Eu(9t))  = (i  (5-4)
when the social groups cooperate,  and
w' ('a  (ot,z(ot))±  uz(9t))  ±  =  (5.5)
when they interact  non-cooperatively.  As evident, the donor now internalizes  the cost
of rent-dissipation.  The  political  competition  over the common resources  (including
aid) creates  a wedge, 1/n,  between the marginal utility  of the recipients'  consumption
and the opportunity  cost of foreign aid.  In other words, the rent-seeking  contest results
in a "tax"  on foreign aid.  If the  tax  effect dominates,  more aid will be given in  the
cooperative  setting  for each 0, implying that  the mechanism that  enforces cooperation
becomes stronger.  Thus,
Proposition  5.2.  A  donor  with  access to  binding policy  commitment  generally
strengthen  thle mechanism  that  enforces cooperation, thereby increasing the threshold
value  °t.
Proof.  See appendix  A.6. E
6.  Some  preliminary  evidence
6.1.  Empirical  prediction
In  this  section  we take  a  first  step  to  empirically  test  the  predictions  of the  model.
The test,  however, is bound  to be only suggestive., There  are at least three  reasons for
this.  First,  time  series observations  for sufficiently long periods  and  of decent quality
are only available  for  a small  subset  of the  relevant variables,  implying  that  we are
constrained  to  analyze  the  medium  term  implications  of the  model.  Second,  since
manipulations  of the  political  system  are seldom done in open and  are almost  never
recorded, we cannot  directly measure the degree of policy division. As an  alternative,
we try  to  identify  characteristics  of  the  political  and  socio-political  structure  of a
country  which  are plausibly  correlated  with  the  existence of influential  social groups
13and,  consequently, a divided policy process.  Finally, since we cannot a priori determine
the cutoff value a  and as actual disbursements  of aid are likely to be (highly) correlated
with  expectations  of future  assistance,  we are not  able to distinguish  between the two
mechanisms  summarized  in propositions  4.3 and 5.1.
With  these  limitations  in  mind,  the  model's  main  prediction  can be  stated  as,
discretionary  aid  (or expectations thereof)  and windfalls,  in  countries suffering from
a divided fiscal process, will on average increase the level of rent-seeking activities.
To test  this  implication,  we specify the following equation
Zit =  /zxt  + Ydit + (zwit  + Oz(witdzt)  +  'r  (6.1)
where  zit  is a measure  of the  average  level of rent-seeking  activities  in  period  t  for
country i, dit is a proxy of a divided policy process, vvit is a vector of windfalls proxies
including  the  level of aid disbursed  to  country  i,  denoted  by ait, and  xit is a vector
of other  variables  that  affect the  level of rent dissipation.  The model suggests that  a
is an endogenous variable.  In fact,  the equilibrium  under  commitment  implies that  a
will be lower when  z  is higher.  For this  reason  we also specify an  aid-determinants
equation,
ait  =  /3avit +  /'zit  + E'  (6.2)
where  vit  is a  vector  of other  variables  that  affect the  amount  of aid  disbursed  to
country i.  Once we properly  instrument  for aid, we can test our null hypothesis  that
the  marginal  impact  of aid  and  windfalls on z depends  on the political  equilibrium,
i.e. we test  Ho:  (z + Ozd > 0 against  HA: CZ  + OZd  < 0.
6.2.  Data  and  base  specification
Following Easterly  & Levine (1997), we choose a measure  of ethnic  diversity  (ETH)
as proxy for the likelihood of competing social groups in a country. A vast political sci-
ence literature  links ethnic  groups with  redistributive  policies in developing countries,
particularly  in  Africa.9 ETH  measures  the  probability  that  two randomly  selected
individuals  in a country  will belong to  different ethnolinguistic  groups.  The raw data
for ETH  refers to  1960.  ETH  increases with  the  number  of ethnolinguistic  groups
and the more equal is the size of the groups.  Obviously, ethnic fractionalization  is not
a necessary,  and  much less a  sufficient, condition  for a  divided policy process,  since
coalitions with power to extract  trainsfers from the rest of society may be formed along
many  other  lines.  Consequently,  we do not  claim that  ETH  is a valid  measure  for
all countries, nor  that  other measures cannot  be employed to  capture  the existence of
influential  interest  groups.  However, we think  that  given our focus on powerful social
groups,  on  average  our  proxy  is  correlated  with  the  occurrence  of a  divided  policy
process.
9Easterly & Levine (1997) discuss the concept in more detail. See also Mauro (1995) who employ
ETH  as an instrument for bureaucratic efficiency.
14To proxy for the  dependent  variable rent-dissipation,  we employ an  index of cor-
ruption  drawn from ICRG  [see Knack & Keefer, 1995]. The index is on a scale from 0
to 6. We reverse the scale so that  0 indicates least corrupt  and 6 most corrupt  (COR).
Obviously, rent  dissipation  can take many other  forms than  corruption,  e.g.  indirect
costs of latent  social conflicts; such as protection  costs, resources employed to seize, or
attempt  to seize, power and restrict  opponents  political  activities.  However, this type
of data  is not  readily available.  Moreover, it is hard  to see why increased  pressure for
redistribution  would manifest  itself  only through  certain  channels  (e.g.  costs of po-
litical competition)  and not  through  all different types  available for the social groups
(e.g. corruption).  Presumably  the social groups are equalizing the marginal costs and
benefits  along the different  dimensions of rent-seeking  activities.
Previous  studies  of foreign  aid have used  a measure  of aid that  lumps  together
grants  and  concessional loans.  The  World Bank  has  developed  a new data  base  on
foreign aid, where the grant  component  of each concessional loan has been calculated
and added to outright  grants  to provide a more accurate  measure of foreign assistance.
The raw aid data  is in current  U.S. dollars.  Following Burnside  & Dollar (1997), we
convert  the  data  into  constant  dollars  to  real  GDP.  This  provides  a  real  measure
of aid  (denoted  by  AID)  that  is constant  in  terms  of its  purchasing  power  over a
representative  bundle  of world imports.
We also employ two  additional  proxies  of windfalls;  term  of trade  shocks (TT),
the average growth  rate  of dollar export  prices times initial  share  of exports  in GDP
minus the average growth rate  of import  prices times initial share of imports  to GDP;
and  the  share  of exports  of primary  products  in GDP  (SXP).  The  latter  measure
is meant  to  capture  discoveries of natural  (mineral)  resources  which  are  important
sources of windfall gains  in many developing countries.10
The level of rent-seeking  is also a function of the discount factor 6. A lower 6 leads
to a higher expected z.  To proxy for 6 we employ regional-specific dummy variables for
Sub-Saharan  Africa (AFRICA),  Central  America (CAM),  and East Asia (ASIA).  In
the base specification we also include time dummies to control for time-specific effects.
Motivated  by the theory  we assume that  aid is driven both  by donors' interest  and
recipients' needs.  In the base specification we include the log of population  (LPOP)  to
proxy for donors'  interests,  and initial  log of real GDP per capita  (LGDP)  to control
for recipients'  needs motives.  We also include TT.  According to the model, a negative
income shock will result  in increased aid flows.
We are able  to  collect data  for 66 aid recipient  countries  starting  from  1980.  To
increase  the  size of the  sample,  but  also to  explore  the time  dimension  in the  data,
we divide  the  cross-country  data  into three  5-year periods.  Thus,  each  country  has
three  observations,  data  permitting.  The system  of equations  is estimated  by 2SLS,
allowing for country-specific  random  effects. 1'
' 0Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that  resource-rich economies are more likely to  be subject to
extreme rent-seeking behavior than resources-poor economies.
"Because we use 2SLS we must also specify an equation for the  interaction term  a*d.  See the
156.3.  Results
As  a  benchmark,  the  simple regression  of corruption  on  ETH  is highly  significant,
with  a  t-statistic  of 3.71.  If we add  the  vector  of windfalls proxies  and  AID  to  this
regression we obtain  the equation  system  (la)-(lb)  shown in table  1. As evident,  if we
do not  control for the political  equilibrium,  there  is no significant correlation  between
COR  and  the  regressors  AID,  SXP  and  TT.  In  the  aid  regression,  both  initial
income,  proxying  for recipients'  needs motives,  and  the log of population,  are highly
significant.  COR  and  TT  enter  with  negative  signs in  (lb),  but  are insignificant.  If
the  donor  could  credibly  commit  to  a  policy  rule,  we would  expect  the  coefficient
on  COR  to  be significantly  different  from zero.  However, in the  model in which aid
is determined  under  discretion,  a  is constant  for all  z if 0  >  0  (see appendix  A.5).
Hence, the  data  suggest  that  the  donor community  acts under  discretion  and  do not
systematically  allocate  aid to countries with less corruption.  Overall, our instruments
for aid are rather  powerful.  The R2 in the first-stage  regression of AID  increases from
0.10 to 0.60 when  LGDP and  LPOP  are included.
Adding  the regional  dummies and  the interaction  terms yields the  base specifica-
tion reported  in columns (1c)-(ld).  We instrument  for AID*ETH  by including  ETH
interacted  with  several of the  regressors in  (6.2).  In  the base  specification  ETH  is
interacted  with  the  time  and  regional  dummies. 12 In  column  (1c),  AID*ETH  and
SXP*ETH  are positive  and  highly significant, while TT*ETH  enters with  the pre-
dicted  sign, but  is not  significantly different from zero. However, the joint  hypothesis
that  the coefficients on all interaction  terms are zeros is rejected by a wide margin  [F-
statistic  4.121. In accordance  with  the prediction  of the model,  the partial  derivatives
of corruption  with respect  to  AID  and  SXP  are positive for high  levels of ETH.  In
particular,  the marginal  impact  of AID  [SXP]  on COR  is positive  for ETH  >  0.18
[ETH  >  0.64] implying  that  for 47 [27] out  of 66 countries  in the  sample,  increased
aid [discovery of exploitable  resources] is associated with higher corruption.  The mag-
nitude  of the  correlation  between  aid and  corruption  is  considerable.  For  the most
fractionalized  country  (ETH  = 0.93), a one-standard  deviation  increase  in predicted
aid (2.0 percentage  points)  is associated  with  a 0.8 standard  deviation increase in the
corruption  index  (0.8 points).
As reported  above, there is no significant relationship  between the level of aid and
TT.  However, a closer look at the data reveals the change in aid during the subperiods,
ŽAI1D,  is responsive to terms of trade  shocks, particularly  in fractionalized  countries.
discussion  in the text below.
12These  interaction  terms  are highly  correlated  with ETH*AID (F-statistic  on  the joint hypothesis
that the coefficients  on the interaction  variables  are zero in the first-stage  regression  is 5.95), but
uncorrelated  with AID (F-statistic  in the first-stage  regression  iis  0.70). They are also uncorrelated
with shocks  to AID and COR which  make  them good  candidates  for instruments.  ETH interacted
with the additional  regressors  in (6.2), i.e. LPOP and LGDP, are less  suitable  as instruments  for
ETH*AID since  they are highly  correlated  with the endogenous  variable  AID  (F-statistic in the
first-stage  regression  is 12.21).
16The  simple correlation  between  TT  and  zAID  for the most  fractionalized  countries
(top 20 %) is 0.27.13 If terms of trade shocks are (partly)  counterbalanced  by aid flows,
it  is not  surprising  that  TT*ELF  is insignificantly  different  from zero.  In  columns
(le)-(lf)  we try  circumvent  the  multicollinearity  problem  by  including  the  sum  of
AID  and  TT  as  a  regressor.  Note  that  both  variables  are measured  as  a share  of
GDP.  Taking  as a  reference point  a  situation  without  aid,  (AID  + TT)  provides  a
measure  of the  change  of "exogenous"  resources  flowing into  the  country.  As shown
in  column  (le),  the  results  improve with  this  specification.  Both  the  coefficients and
the t-statistics  on the interaction  terms are higher.  Using the sum of AID  and  TT  as
regressor, the  cutoff point  for the derivative  of COR  with  respect  to  (AID  + TT)  is
ETH  = 0.39, implying  that  for 62 percent  of the  countries in the  sample, an increase
in adjusted  aid, or a positive  terms  of trade  shock not  counterbalanced  by lower aid,
are associated  with hig-her corruption.  Note also that  the "own-effect", is significantly
negative.  In countries  less likely to  suffer from competing social groups, i.e.  countries
with  low ETH,  higher  aid is associated  with lower corruption.
It  is reasonable  to  assume  that  the  mechanism  described  in  the  model  is more
relevant for countries  with a sufficiently high level of aid.  Thus,  we estimate  the effect
of aid on corruption  for countries  with  a share  of aid to  GDP  above 0.1 percent.14
The  results  of this  exercise  are  shown in  table  2.  Compared  to  table  1,  AID  and
AID  + TT  are no longer significantly  different from zero, while the interaction  terms
remain highly significant.
Summarizing  the  preliminary  findings,  when  properly  instrumenting  for aid,  the
interaction  term  neatly  separates  the effects of aid on corruption.  On average, foreign
aid in countries  more likely to suffer from a divided policy process is positively  associ-
ated  with corruption.  This  partitioning  fits the prediction  of the model and  underlies
the  general  idea that  the  effects of aid critically  depend on the  political  equilibrium
in the  recipient  country.  Additional  proxies of windfalls show a similar  pattern.  We
find  a  weakly robust  negative  relationship  between  aid  and  corruption  in  countries
less likely to  suffer from  a divided  policy process, while there  is no evidence that  the
donors systematically  allocate  aid to countries with  less corruption.
6.4.  Sensitivity  analyses
We conducted  several robustness  checks. We have already  shown that  the results  are
robust  to the sample of countries.  Another  important  question is whether  the findings
are  robust  to  alternative  specifications.  To  check this  we first  included  additional
controls in the aid regression, namely  the most  commonly used explanatory  variables
in the literature  on the determinants  of aid, apart  from LGDP  and  LPOP,  the infant
mortality  rate  at  the  start  of the  period  (INFM),  and  arms  imports  as  a share  of
131f Nigeria  is excluded,  the  correlation  jumps  to  0.36.
14There  are all together  12 countries  with  a share  of aid  to GDP  below 0.1 percent  in at  least  one
of the  three  subperiods.
17total  imports  lagged one period  (ARM).  Equation  (6.1) was also augmented  with  a
battery  of variables  that  might  plausibly  control  for  other  factors  which  affect  the
level of corruption.  For instance,  a  measure  of (trade)  distortions  in the  economy;
black-market  premium  (BMP),  and  a  proxy  for openness;  share  of trade  to  GDP
(TRADE).  As an alternative,  we also use the composite measure openness from Sachs
& Warner (OPEN).  The original rent-seeking literature  emphasized trade  restrictions
as the primary  source of (government induced) rents  [Krueger (1974)]. More generally,
protection  from international  competition  generates rents that  business may be willing
to  pay for.
Table 3 summarizes  the results of this exercise." 5 Overall, once we control for ETH
none of the additional  controls have any significant effect on COR,  and the results  of
the other regressors, in particular  AID*ETH,  remain  qualitatively  unaffected.16 The
t-statistic  on SXP*TT  is reduced.  However, the joint  hypothesis that  the  coefficients
on all interaction  terms  are  zeros can be  rejected  at  the  5-percent  level  [F-statistic
3.46]. We find no evidence that  the level of aid is significantly correlated  with  ARM
or INFM,  even though  ARM  enters with the predicted  sign and  a p value of around
0.15.
Finally,  we did  a  Hausman  test  of the  over-identifying  restrictions  on  the  base
specification  reported  in  columns  (1c)-(ld).  We cannot  reject  the  over-identifying
restrictions;  i.e., we find no evidence that  the  instruments  for AID  [COR] belong in
the  corruption  [aid] regression.17
7.  Concluding  remarks
The present  model has  abstracted  from a number  of issues influencing public  policy
in  developing countries.  The  analysis may therefore  be  biased and it would be  inap-
propriate  to  draw any definite conclusions.  Nevertheless,  some important  qualitative
insights  emerge from the  analysis.  First,  we have shown. that  the  provision  of public
goods  does not  need  to  increase  with  higher  government  revenue,  thus  providing  a
political-economy  rationale  for why large windfall gains  in  revenue,  or large  inflows
of foreign aid,  do not  necessarily  result  in  general  welfare gains.  Second,  we have
shown that  expectations  of aid in  the future  may suffice to  increase rent  dissipation
and reduce the expected  level of public goods provision.
From  a  policy  perspective,  there  are  three  main  implications  of these  findings.
First,  at  a general  level,  the  model  points  to  the  importance  of studying  the  inter-
15To  conserve  space  some  of the controls  are added  simultaneously.  Inserting  the controls  individ-
ually does  not lead to significantly  different  results.
16This result  may be partly  due to the  fact that  policy variables such as BMP  and  TRADE  might
be endogenous  to ETH.  In fact,  Easterly  & Levine (1997) show that  ETH  and BMP  is significantly
correlated.
" 7The  test  statistics  are  9.08  and  12.56  respectively.  The  5  [11 percent  critical  value  from  the
x2 -distribution  are  11.07 [15.091  for regression  (1c), and  12.59 [16.81] for regression  (id).
18action  between  the  political  process  shaping  public  policy and  foreign aid.  Second,
concessional assistance  may influence policy in the recipient  country even without  any
resources actually  being disbursed,  implying that  evaluations of project  and sector as-
sistance may overestimate  the total  impact of foreign aid.  Finally, the analysis stresses
the important  issue of commitment  in foreign aid policy. In particular  we have shown
that  if the  donor  community  can enter  into a  binding  policy commitment,  aid may
mitigate  the  incentives  for  social groups  to  engage  in  rent-seeking  activities.  This
result  is in  accordance  with  recent  empirical  findings that  aid is more  effective the
greater  effort is made  to  redirect  it  to  good performers  [Burnside  & Dollar  (1997)].
However, such a  regime shift  would involve an  aid policy that  in the  short  run  pro-
vides  more assistance  to countries  in  less need, and  less assistance  to  those  in most
need.  Enforcing such a regime shift may be  difficult [Svensson (1997)]. Clearly, more
research should follow along these lines.
We provide  some  empirical  evidence  in  support  of the  mechanism  we propose.
Employing  a measure  of ethnic  and  linguistic  fractionalization  to proxy  for the  like-
lihood that  a country  suffers from a divided policy control, we show that  foreign aid
and  windfalls  in  countries  characterized  by a  divided  policy  process  are  associated
with increased  corruption.  We find a weakly robust  negative relationship  between aid
and  corruption  in countries  less likely to  suffer from a  divided  policy process,  while
there  is no evidence that  the donors systematically  allocate  aid to  countries with  less
corruption.  These results  are robust  to  an ample of statistical  problems.
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21A.  Appendix
A.1.  Data  description  and  sources
AFRICA  Dummy variable for Sub-Saharan African countries.
AID = Grants and grant equivalents  of concessional  loans [Fernandez-Ariaa  & Serven (1997)]
deflated by import unit value index (US$) 1985=100 [IFS] to real GDP (1985=base year)
[Penn World Tables 5.6], averages over 1980-84,  85-89, 90-93.
ARM = Arm imports to total imports, averages, lagged one period [ACDA,  World Military
and Arms Transfers].
ASIA  =  Dummy variable  for East  Asian  countries.
BMP  = Log of 1+black market premium (black-market xrate/official xrate  - 1) [World
Bank National Accounts, World's Currency Yearbook, average over 1980-84,  85-89, 90-92.
CAM  Dummy variable for Central American countries.
COR  Indices of corruption from ICRG, [Knack & Keefer (1995)],  where 0 indicates least
corrupt and 6 most corrupt, averages  over 1982-84,  85-89, 90-94.
ETH  = Index of ethnolingiistic fractionalization, 1960. Measures the probability that  two
randomly selected people in a country belong to different ethnolinguistic groups [Easterly &
Levine (1997)].
INFM  = Infant mortality rate per 1000  live births at the start of the sample period (1980,
87, 92) [World Development  Indicators,].
LGDP =  Log of initial real per capita GDP [Penn World Tables 5.61
LPOP =  Log of total population in 100.000  units at the start of sample period [World  Bank
Development  Indicators].
OPEN  = Openness dummy from Sachs & Warner (1995), 1 = open, 0 = not open at the
start of the sample period.
SXP  =  Share of exports of primary products in GDP measured in nominal US$, units
percentage points at the start of the sample period [World  Bank Trade Statistics].
TRADE  = Sum of the initial shares of exports and  imports in GDP times 0.5.  [World
Development Indicators].
TT = the average growth rate of dollar export prices times initial share of exports in GDP
minus the average growth rate of import prices times initial share of imports to GDP [World
Bank Development  Indicators].
A.2.  Sufficient  conditions  for  the  existence  of a fixed  point
Let 9t be a candidate for a fixed point and define
Q(O')  = Y(9') - _  P(O')  (A.1)
Since Q(Ot)  is continuous, a sufficient condition is that Q(£) < 0 and Q(6) >  0. Using (3.2)
and (4.2), equation (4.3) can be written as
P(0t) =  (n  [  I) |  y(t)dF(jt)  +- (1-  F(  (t)  O(it)  - 2  X.)dF(t)]  (A.2)
22where  3  =-  61(1 - 6).  By inserting  (A.2)  into (A.1) and  simplifying  we obtain
(n-  1)]  +  n2  Y(Ot)dF(Ot)  < 0  (A.3)
The  second term  in  (A.3) is positive.  Hence, a necessary  condition  for Q(O)  < 0 is that  the
term  in the  bracket  is negative.  This  holds provided  that
n  <  (A.4)
In absolute  terms  the first  term  in  (A.3) must  also outweigh the  second  term.  Hence
y(o)r  > (,/n 2)E[y(Ot)]  (A.5)
The other  necessary  condition  is given by  the following equation
Q(9) = Y(Ot)  - 4  y(Ot)dF(Ot)  > 0  (A.6)
Hence, a sufficient condition  is that
Y(Ot)/1  y(Ot)dF(Ot)  >  (1  )n2 (A.7)
in which  case the  difference between  the first  two terms  is positive.
A.3.  Proof  of  corollary  4.4
Lemma  4.2.  states  that  there  exist  a  °t  such that  0.(&)  =  0.  Moreover, since Q(°t)  > 0, Q
must  be increasing  in  0 at  the  largest  value of 0 for which Q(Ot)  =  0. To explore  the  effect
of a change in the  number  of social  groups  it is informative  to  rewrite  (A.1)  as
o(ot) =  vC(6t) - i-  1)P(bt)  (A.8)
For  fixed Ct, zi(Ot)  and  vn(0t),  vc(°t)  and P(6t)  are  inversely  proportional  to  n.  Hence,
an increase  in n  raises  Q  since  vc(0t)  increases  relative  P(Gt)/(n  - 1).  This  effect tends  to
increase  the incentives  to deviate.  To counter-balance  this  0 must fall.  However, an increase
in n  also  affects the  expected  punishment.  This  effect,  though,  is non-monotonic.  For  a
fixed 0t,
a~  r~ ^  )  n  1t  [2--n]y(Ot)/n 3 for Ot  < 6t
9n  [V\t 7 (Ot)=  [2y(Ot)  - ny(6t)]/n3 for Ot > °t
23A.4.  Proof  of proposition  5.1
The equilibrium  with  aid is denoted  by  subscript  a.  For convenience  time  and  group  sub-
scripts  are  dropped.  Let  y(01)  denote  the  cutoff  value  of y(O) for  which  (5.2)  no  longer
binds  in the  fully cooperative  equilibrium,  i.e.  y(O1)  = wcU7%)  - nyc.  Comparing  with  the
equilibrium  without  aid  we see  that  welfare  of the  social  groups  in  the  fully  cooperative
equilibrium  is constant  Vy(Ot)  c  [y(O),  y(01)], implying  that  a  deviation  must  occur  when
y(Ot)  >  y(01).  This  is  so because  if  it  is profitable  to  deviate  at  some  y(G) <  y(0),  it
must  be  profitable  to  deviate  for all  y(O).  In  this  case  there  exist  no  equilibrium.  More-
over, ac(Ot)  =  0 Vy(Ot)  E [y(9O),  y(O)]. Hence, the gain of a deviation is not affected by the
inclusion of a donor.  At  the  same time  Pa(O') < P(9')  since
F02
Pa(O') =  B  9  [uc(0t) - uC(0I)] dF(Ot) +  X0  [C(,  Ot)  - u(0  )] dF(Ot)  (A.9)
is strictly  smaller  than  P(9')  given in  (4.3).  Hence,  QXa(O')  >  Q(O').  Consequently  9 must
fall.
A.5.  Sufficient  conditions  for  the  coexistence  of  rent-seeking  and  aid  in
equilibrium  with  discretion
Let  the donor's  preferences  be
,t  l(ft) + w(  uit)  (A.10)
t=l  i  I
where 1(.) is an increasing  and  concave function.  As in section  5.1.1. we assume  that  aid is
given as project  support.  The first-order  condition  (5.2) is now given by:
w  (  [ci(Ot  lat)  + bi(Ot  lat)])  1l(ft)  < O  (A.11)
where  ci(Ot  Iat)  and  bi(Ot  tat)  are defined in section  5.1.1.
The  only difference  from  section  5.1.1  is that  there  is now  no longer  a  constant  lower
bound  on welfare.  In this  setup  aid and  rent-seeking  can coexist.  In  fact,  for all 0 > O, aid
will be constant,  implicitly  defined  by the  first-order  condition  (A.12).
w' (y(dt)  + ac(6t) + nyc)  - 1'  (r  - a'z(t))  = 0  (A.12)
Since aid increases  the  potential  amount  of resources  to be  appropriated,  foreign  assis-
tance  increases the  incentives to deviate.  Hence, a sufficient condition  for Proposition  5.1 to
hold is that  the  punishment  with  aid will become less harsh.  That  is:
(vA - vA4)  < (vc - v')  VO  c IV,  6  (A.13)
which is satisfied  since more aid  is given in the Nash-  relat.ive the  cooperative  equilibrium.
24A.6. Proof  of proposition  5.2
This can be seen by the following  two part argument.  First, as shown above, the gain of a
deviation is not affected  by the inclusion of a donor. Second, solving for the equilibrium aid
flows in the two institutional settings we have
n
ac(Ot)  =  w- (so)  - u  E  (0t)  (A.14)
i=l
and
aO(Gt)  =  n  (np)  - (0t)  (A.15)
Evaluating equations (A.14-)-(A.15)  we see that  there are two opposite forces determining
the amount of aid disbursed in the two institutional settings,  First, utility is lower in the
Nash equilibrium which tends to increase aid flows  in the non-cooperative  setting. Second, a
larger amount of aid will be wasted in rent-dissipation in the Nash equilibrium which tends
to lower aid flows. Which effect that  dominates depends on the parameters of the model.
Using a CES-function with constant elasticity of substitution equal to 1/o to solve explicitly
for the equilibrium aid flows  we can show that a'(0t) > an(ot) Vy(Ot)  provided that
vi  -2  Ln(n  _  ) )]V_/  (A.16)
A sufficient condition for (A.16) is that  a < 1 in which case the term in bracket is negative
and the difference  in welfare between the cooperative- and Nash equilibrium increases.
25Table  1
COR  AID  COR  AID  COR  AID
Expl.var.  (la)  (lb)  (Ic)  (145)  (le)  (if)
ETH  .82  -.13  -.42
(3.02)  (-.24)  (-.71)
AID  .04  -.09
(1.08)  (-.73)
SXP  -.002  -.04  -.03
(-.25)  (-2.53)  (-2.17)
TT  -.06  -.13  -.14  -.07  -.07
(-1.00)  (-.71)  (-1.28)  (-.49)  (-.51)
COR  -.81  -.11  -.15
(-.72)  (-.38)  (-.47)
LPOP  -.83  -.83  -.83
(-4.81)  (-5.28)  (-5.26)
LGDP  -2.36  -2.17  -2.18
(-5.36)  (-7.94)  (-7.93)
AID*ETH  .50
(2.43)








AFRICA  -1.22  -.98
(-5.00)  (-4.40)
ASIA  -.27  -.19
(-1.04)  (-.22)
CAM  -.25  -.07
(-.75)  (-.22)
no.obs.  182  182  182  182  182  182
Note: 2SLS-estimation  on pooled  data  (1980-84, 85-89, 90-94), with  t-statistics  adjusted  for
country-specific  random  effects.  Each regression  includes a constant  and  two time  dummies
not reported  here.
26Table  2
COR  AID  COR  AID
Expl.var.  (2a)  (2b)  (2c)  (2d)




SXP  -.07  -.05
(-2.87)  (-2.26)
TT  -.08  -.10  -.11
(-.69)  (-.74)  (-.75)
COR  -.01  -.02
(-.02)  (-.06)
LPOP  -.97  -.97
(-5.05)  (-5.04)












AFRICA  -1.27  -1.01
(-5.10)  (-4.46)
ASIA  -.40  -.28
(-1.33)  (-.96)
CAM  -.33  -.22
(-1.03)  (-.67)
no.obs.  162  162  162  162
Note: 2SLS-estimation  on pooled  data  (1980-84, 85-89, 90-94), with  t-statistics  adjusted  for
country-specific  random  effects.  Each regression includes  a constant  and  two time  dummies
not reported  here.
27Table  3
COR  AID  COR  AID
Expl.var.  (3a)  (3b)  (3c)  (3d)
ETH  -.35  -.50
(-.58)  (--  .73)
AID  -.16
(-1.50)
SXP  -.03  -.03
(-1.53)  (- 1.39)
TT  -.15  -.01  -.09
(-1.09)  (-.06)  (-.56)
COR  .06  -.07
(.18)  (.1
LPOP  -.83  -.81
(-4.69)  (-4.84)

















ARM  .02  .02
(1.43)  (1.35)
INFM  .001  .003
(.04)  (.52)
no.obs.  166  166  165  165
Note: 2SLS-estimation  on pooled data,  with t-statistics  adjusted  for country-specific  random
effects.  Each  regression  includes  a  constant  and  two  time  dummies,  and  the  corruption
regressions also include  three  regional  dummies,  not reported  here.
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